

### Supplementary Information

Table S1 and S2 shows results from the trust game that was played after the main task (see methods section). As shown in Table S1, there was no significant difference in extended trust between group members in the reset and shadow treatment compared to the control treatment. Descriptively, however, participants in the reset treatment transferred around 1 unit more to their receiver compared to the control treatment. As Table S2 shows, we did not observe significant differences in reciprocity (i.e., back-transfers in the trust game) across conditions. We should note that participants were told that they are paired with one other group member of the previous task. However, they did not know which participant and also not which role this participant had (i.e., defender vs. attacker or in-group vs. out-group member). Future studies could therefore test whether a conflict episode influences trust when participants actually know who they interact with (e.g., former perpetrator vs. victim).

**Table S1. Trust decisions.**

Regression modeling average trust between group members as a function of treatment.

Coefficient	estimate est. (std. error)	p-value
intercept ( <i>treatment = control</i> )	5.163 (0.348)	<0.001
reset	0.938 (0.493)	0.062
shadow	0.325 (0.493)	0.512

**Table S2. Reciprocity decisions.**

Regression modeling average reciprocity of trust between group members as a function of treatment.

Coefficient	estimate est. (std. error)	p-value
intercept ( <i>treatment = control</i> )	6.022 (0.335)	<0.001
reset	-0.045 (0.474)	0.925
shadow	0.141 (0.474)	0.768

The figures below show screenshots from the instructions and the decision interface, as shown on the computers of participants (with exemplary input).

*Figure S1-S5:* Instructions of the attacker-defender game.


*Figure S6-S8:* Comprehension checks of the attacker-defender game.

*Figure S9-S10:* Decision screens of the attacker-defender game.


*Figure S11-S16:* Instructions of the public-goods game.

*Figure S17-S21:* Comprehension checks of the public-goods game.

*Figure S22-S29:* Decision screens of the public-goods game.



*Figure S1.* Attacker-defender game instructions (page 1).



*Figure S2.* Attacker-defender game instructions (page 2).

## Instructions

We now explain how your decisions and the decisions of the other participants can affect each others' outcome. Please read carefully. Your earnings depend on how well you understand the rules of the task.

You either belong to **group A** or **group B**.  
You will learn to which group you belong shortly.

In each round, each group member receives **20 MU**.  
Each group member then decides how many of these MU to **invest** and how many of these MU to **keep** (in whole numbers).  
Then the **investments** of **group A** and **group B** are compared.

Every MU that was invested is gone.  
However, it can happen that **group B** loses all the MU that they decided to **keep**.  
Further, it can happen that **group A** receive all the MU that **group B** decided to **keep**.

Specifically there are three possible scenarios:

**SCENARIO 1: Group A invests *more* than group B.**  
In this case, **group A** will receive all the MU that were not invested from **group B**.

For example, **group A**, together, invests 15 MU and keeps 25 MU. **Group B**, together, invests 10 MU and keeps 30 MU.  
Because **group A** invested *more* than **group B**, **group A** will receive all the MU from **group B** that they did not invest.  
Specifically, members of **group A** will receive the remaining 30 MU from **group B**. These 30 MU are divided equally among the members of **group A**.  
The members of **group A** will also earn all the MU that they did not invest.

Hence, each member of **group A** will receive 15 MU from **group B** on top of the MU that they decided to keep.  
In this scenario, members from **group B** will earn 0 MU.

**SCENARIO 2: Group A invests *less* than group B.**  
In this case, group members from **group A** will receive the MU that they did not invest.  
Also group members from **group B** will receive all the MU that they did not invest.

For example, **group A**, together, invests 10 MU and keeps 30 MU. **Group B**, together, invests 15 MU and keeps 25 MU.  
Because **group A** invested *less* than **group B**, **group A** will *not* receive any MU from **group B**.  
Instead, all participants will keep the MU that they did not invest.

**SCENARIO 3: Group A invests *the same amount* as group B.**  
In this case, group members from **group A** will receive the MU that they did not invest.  
Also group members from **group B** will receive all the MU that they did not invest.

For example, **group A**, together, invests 12 MU and keeps 28 MU. **Group B**, together, invests 12 MU and keeps 28 MU.  
Because **group A** invested *the same amount* as **group B**, **group A** will *not* receive any MU from **group B**.  
Instead, all participants will keep the MU that they did not invest, as in Scenario 2.

On the next page, you will learn which group you will be part of.

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Figure S3. Attacker-defender game instructions (page 3).




Figure S4. Attacker-defender game instructions (attacker role, page 4).




Figure S5. Attacker-defender game instructions (page 5).

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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**Question 1.** How much I earn in this experiment depends partly on my own behaviour.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 2.** How much I earn in this experiment may depend on the behaviour of the other participants.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 3.** This part of the experiment consists of 15 rounds.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 4.** I am part of group A.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

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Figure S6. Attacker-defender game - comprehension questions (page 1). Correct answers highlighted.

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Consider the following hypothetical round of the experiment:

Group member 1 from group A invests 14 MU and keeps 6 MU.  
Group member 2 from group A invests 9 MU and keeps 11 MU.

Group member 1 from group B invests 4 MU and keeps 16 MU.  
Group member 2 from group B invests 10 MU and keeps 10 MU.

Hence, group A invests 23 MU in total.  
Hence, group B invests 14 MU in total.

**Question 5.** How many MU would group member 1 from group A earn in this example?

☐ 0   ☐ 6   ☐ 13   ☒ 19

**Question 6.** How many MU would group member 2 from group A earn in this example?

☐ 0   ☐ 11   ☐ 13   ☒ 24

**Question 7.** How many MU would group member 1 from group B earn in this example?

☒ 0   ☐ 10   ☐ 14   ☐ 24

**Question 8.** How many MU would group member 2 from group B earn in this example?

☒ 0   ☐ 14   ☐ 16   ☐ 24

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Figure S7. Attacker-defender game - comprehension questions (page 2). Correct answers highlighted.

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Consider the following hypothetical round of the experiment:

Group member 1 from group A invests 4 MU and keeps 16 MU.  
Group member 2 from group A invests 10 MU and keeps 10 MU.

Group member 1 from group B invests 8 MU and keeps 12 MU.  
Group member 2 from group B invests 14 MU and keeps 6 MU.

Hence, group A invests 14 MU in total.

Hence, group B invests 22 MU in total.

**Question 9.** How many MU would group member 1 from group A earn in this example?

- ☐ 0   ☐ 4   ☒ 16   ☐ 31

**Question 10.** How many MU would group member 2 from group A earn in this example?

- ☐ 0   ☒ 10   ☐ 16   ☐ 29

**Question 11.** How many MU would group member 1 from group B earn in this example?

- ☐ 0   ☐ 8   ☒ 12   ☐ 25

**Question 12.** How many MU would group member 2 from group B earn in this example?

- ☐ 0   ☒ 6   ☐ 14   ☐ 16

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Figure S8. Attacker-defender game - comprehension questions (page 3). Correct answers highlighted.



Round 1/15

You have **20 MU** this round.

You are part of **group A**.

Please decide how you want to allocate your MU.

invest:  MU

keep:  MU

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Figure S9. Attacker-defender game - decision screen with exemplary input.

investment overview

You invested **6 MU** and kept **14 MU**.

Group A (your group) invested **16 MU** in total.

Group B invested **14 MU** in total.

outcome

Group A (your group) invested more than Group B.

Therefore, the remaining **26 MU** of Group B are transferred to Group A.

earnings

Group A (your group) earned **50 MU** in total.

Group B earned **0 MU** in total.

Personally, you earned **27 MU** in this round (14 MU kept + 13 MU received).

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Figure S10. Attacker-defender game - exemplary feedback screen.




Figure S11. Public goods game instructions (page 1).




Figure S12. Public goods game instructions (page 2).

## Instructions

Here are the rules again:

- You and each of the other participants will receive **20 monetary units (MU)** each
- Each participant, including you, then decides how many of their MU to **keep** and how many of their MU to **invest**
- Each participant is **free** to invest their MU as they like in increments of 1
- Each MU that is **kept** increases the payment of *this participant* by 1 MU
- By contrast, each MU that is **invested** influences the payment of all participants. For each **invested MU**, *each of the 4 participants* receives 0.4 MU in return (with a total return of 1.6 MU)
- You will interact for 3 rounds

The following hypothetical examples illustrate this task. For simplicity, we refer to the participants as participant 1-4 in these examples.

**Example 1**

Assume ...

Participant 1 decides to **invest 20 MU** and **keep 0 MU**  
 Participant 2 decides to **invest 20 MU** and **keep 0 MU**  
 Participant 3 decides to **invest 20 MU** and **keep 0 MU**  
 Participant 4 decides to **invest 20 MU** and **keep 0 MU**

Hence, **80 MU** are **invested** in total.  
 For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
 Therefore, each participant receives  $80 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = 32 \text{ MU}$ .

Consequently, ...

Participant 1 earns: 0 MU (kept) + 32 MU (from the total investments) = **32 MU**  
 Participant 2 earns: 0 MU (kept) + 32 MU (from the total investments) = **32 MU**  
 Participant 3 earns: 0 MU (kept) + 32 MU (from the total investments) = **32 MU**  
 Participant 4 earns: 0 MU (kept) + 32 MU (from the total investments) = **32 MU**

**Example 2**

Assume ...

Participant 1 decides to **invest 0 MU** and **keep 20 MU**  
 Participant 2 decides to **invest 0 MU** and **keep 20 MU**  
 Participant 3 decides to **invest 0 MU** and **keep 20 MU**  
 Participant 4 decides to **invest 0 MU** and **keep 20 MU**

Hence, **0 MU** are **invested** in total.  
 For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
 Therefore, each participant receives  $0 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = 0 \text{ MU}$ .

Consequently, ...

Participant 1 earns: 20 MU (kept) + 0 MU (from the total investments) = **20 MU**  
 Participant 2 earns: 20 MU (kept) + 0 MU (from the total investments) = **20 MU**  
 Participant 3 earns: 20 MU (kept) + 0 MU (from the total investments) = **20 MU**  
 Participant 4 earns: 20 MU (kept) + 0 MU (from the total investments) = **20 MU**

**Example 3**

Assume ...

Participant 1 decides to **invest 0 MU** and **keep 20 MU**  
 Participant 2 decides to **invest 5 MU** and **keep 15 MU**  
 Participant 3 decides to **invest 10 MU** and **keep 10 MU**  
 Participant 4 decides to **invest 20 MU** and **keep 0 MU**

Hence, **35 MU** are **invested** in total.  
 For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
 Therefore, each participant receives  $35 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = 14 \text{ MU}$ .

Consequently, ...

Participant 1 earns: 20 MU (kept) + 14 MU (from the total investments) = **34 MU**  
 Participant 2 earns: 15 MU (kept) + 14 MU (from the total investments) = **29 MU**  
 Participant 3 earns: 10 MU (kept) + 14 MU (from the total investments) = **24 MU**  
 Participant 4 earns: 0 MU (kept) + 14 MU (from the total investments) = **14 MU**

Please make sure you fully understood the examples above.

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Figure S13. Public goods game instructions (page 3).

## Instructions

Each round will also have a *second* stage.

In the **first stage**, as already explained, you and the other participants will decide how to allocate their MU.

In the **second stage**...

- you will first learn about how the other participants allocated their MU.
- You can then assign **Deduction Points (DP)** to the other participants.
- For each **DP** you assign to another participant, the earnings of this participant for this round will be **reduced by 3 MU**.
- Further, for each **DP** you assign, your earnings will be **reduced by 1 MU**. Hence, each **DP** costs 1 MU.
- You can assign up to **6 DP** to another participant.

The *same rules* apply to the other 3 participants.

They will also decide whether and how many **DP** to assign to each other participant at the same time as you do.

Hence, for each **DP** you receive from another participant, your earnings from the first stage will be reduced by 3 MU.

There is one exception to this rule. If the cost of received **DP** exceeds the participant's first stage income, his or her first stage income will be reduced to zero. However, even in this case the participant must still incur the costs of any **DP** he or she assigned.

Therefore, your earnings in a round are:

**MU you kept + MU return from all investments - DP received from other participants  $\times$  3 - DP you spent yourself**

If the received **DP** reduce your earnings below 0, your earnings are simply:

**0 - DP you spent**

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Figure S14. Public goods game instructions (page 4).

## Instructions

As mentioned before, you will interact with the same 3 participants as before.

However, participants do not belong to **group A** or **group B** anymore.

You will also **not be able to identify** who belonged to **group A** and **group B**.

Instead, individual participant will receive a label, namely: '**Group member 1**', '**Group member 2**', '**Group member 3**', '**Group member 4**'. These labels are randomly assigned at the beginning of this part and will stay the same across the rounds.

As explained before, each invested MU will affect the earnings of all participants in this part, regardless of whether the participant belonged to **group A** or **group B** in the previous part.

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Figure S15. Public goods game instructions (page 4 of the reset treatment).




Figure S16. Public goods game instructions (page 4 of the shadow treatment).

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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**Question 1.** How much I earn in this experiment depends partly on my own behavior.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 2.** How much I earn in this experiment may depend on the behavior of the other participants.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 3.** For each MU that a participants decides to **keep**, only this participant will receive 1 MU.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

**Question 4.** For each MU that a participant decides to **invest**, *every* participant will receive 0.4 MU in return.

☒ correct    ☐ incorrect

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Figure S17. Public goods game - comprehension questions (page 1). Correct answers highlighted.

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Please calculate the earnings for the following, hypothetical scenario.  
The scenario does not necessarily have to make sense, but it is aimed at testing your understanding of the rules of the task.  
Remember, every participant has 20 MU. For simplicity, we refer to the participants as participant 1-4 in these examples.

**Participant 1** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **10 MU**
- invest **10 MU**

**Participant 2** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **6 MU**
- invest **14 MU**

**Participant 3** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **4 MU**
- invest **16 MU**

**Participant 4** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **0 MU**
- invest **20 MU**

Hence, **60 MU** have been invested in total.  
For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
Therefore, each participant receives  $60 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = 24 \text{ MU}$  from the investments.

**Question 5.** How many MU would participant 1 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 6
 ☐ 10
 ☒ 34
 ☐ 50
 ☐ 60

**Question 6.** How many MU would participant 2 earn in this round?

☐ 10
 ☐ 20
 ☒ 30
 ☐ 40
 ☐ 50
 ☐ 60

**Question 7.** How many MU would participant 3 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 4
 ☐ 16
 ☐ 24
 ☒ 28
 ☐ 34

**Question 8.** How many MU would participant 4 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 4
 ☐ 20
 ☒ 24
 ☐ 36
 ☐ 40

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Figure S18. Public goods game - comprehension questions (page 2). Correct answers highlighted.

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Please calculate the earnings for the following, hypothetical scenario.  
The scenario does not necessarily have to make sense, but it is aimed at testing your understanding of the rules of the task.  
Remember, every participant has 20 MU. For simplicity, we refer to the participants as participant 1-4 in these examples.

**Participant 1** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **10 MU**
- invest **10 MU**

**Participant 2** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **10 MU**
- invest **10 MU**

**Participant 3** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **10 MU**
- invest **10 MU**

**Participant 4** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **10 MU**
- invest **10 MU**

Hence, **40 MU** are invested in total.  
For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
Therefore, each participant receives  $40 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = \mathbf{16 \text{ MU}}$  from investments.

**Question 9.** How many MU would participant 1 earn in this round?

☐ 0   ☐ 7   ☐ 10   ☐ 13   ☒ 26   ☐ 36

**Question 10.** How many MU would participant 2 earn in this round?

☐ 0   ☐ 4   ☐ 7   ☐ 10   ☐ 13   ☒ 26

**Question 11.** How many MU would participant 3 earn in this round?

☐ 0   ☐ 4   ☐ 7   ☐ 10   ☒ 26   ☐ 40

**Question 12.** How many MU would participant 4 earn in this round?

☐ 10   ☐ 20   ☒ 26   ☐ 30   ☐ 36   ☐ 40

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Figure S19. Public goods game - comprehension questions (page 3). Correct answers highlighted.



In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Please calculate the earnings for the following, hypothetical scenario.  
The scenario does not necessarily have to make sense, but it is aimed at testing your understanding of the rules of the task.  
Remember, every participant has 20 MU. For simplicity, we refer to the participants as participant 1-4 in these examples.

**Participant 1** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **20 MU**
- invest **0 MU**

**Participant 2** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **20 MU**
- invest **0 MU**

**Participant 3** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **0 MU**
- invest **20 MU**

**Participant 4** distributes his/her MU in the following way:

- keep **0 MU**
- invest **20 MU**

Hence, **40 MU** have been invested in total.  
For each invested MU, each participant receives 0.4 MU.  
Therefore, each participant receives  $40 \text{ MU} \times 0.4 = \mathbf{16 \text{ MU}}$  from the investments.

**Question 13.** How many MU would participant 1 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 10
 ☐ 16
 ☐ 20
 ☒ 36

**Question 14.** How many MU would participant 2 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 10
 ☐ 16
 ☐ 20
 ☒ 36

**Question 15.** How many MU would participant 3 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 10
 ☒ 16
 ☐ 20
 ☐ 36

**Question 16.** How many MU would participant 4 earn in this round?

☐ 0
 ☐ 10
 ☒ 16
 ☐ 20
 ☐ 36

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Figure S20. Public goods game - comprehension questions (page 4). Correct answers highlighted.

In order to make sure that all participants understand the rules of the experiment, we ask you to answer several comprehension questions. You will be able to start with the study if you answer all of the questions correctly. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter.

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Assume ...  
participant 1 assigned 2 DPs to participant 2,  
participant 3 assigned 0 DPs to participant 2,  
participant 4 assigned 3 DPs to participant 2

**Question 17.** By how many MU will the earnings of *participant 2* be *reduced* in this round, because of the DP assignment of the other participants?

☐ 1 MU    ☐ 3 MU    ☐ 5 MU    ☒ 15 MU

Assume ...  
participant 1 assigned 3 DP to participant 2,  
participant 1 assigned 1 DP to participant 3,  
participant 1 assigned 0 DP to participant 4

**Question 18.** By how many MU will the earnings of *participant 1* be *reduced* in this round, because of the DP that participant 1 spent in this round?

☐ 0 MU    ☐ 1 MU    ☐ 3 MU    ☒ 4 MU    ☐ 12 MU

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Figure S21. Public goods game - comprehension questions (page 5). Correct answers highlighted.

Round 1/15

You have **20 MU** this round.

Please decide how you want to allocate your MU.

invest:  MU

keep:  MU

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Figure S22. Public goods game - decision screen with exemplary input (reset treatment).

Round 1/15

You have **20 MU** this round.

You are part of **group A**.

Please decide how you want to allocate your MU.

invest:  MU

keep:  MU

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Figure S23. Public goods game - decision screen with exemplary input (shadow treatment).




Figure S24. Public goods game - exemplary feedback screen (reset treatment).




Figure S25. Public goods game - exemplary feedback screen (shadow treatment).

investment overview

**Group member 1** invested 20 MU and kept 0 MU.

**Group member 2** invested 10 MU and kept 10 MU.

**Group member 3 (you)** invested 5 MU and kept 15 MU.

**Group member 4** invested 0 MU and kept 20 MU.

You can now assign **Deduction Points (DP)** to other group members.  
Remember, for each **DP** you assign, the payoff of this group member is **reduced by 3 MU**.  
For each **DP** you assign to another group member, you have to pay **1 MU**.  
You can assign up to **6 DP** to each other group member.

Assign Deduction Points for **group member 1**:  DP

Assign Deduction Points for **group member 2**:  DP

Assign Deduction Points for **group member 4**:  DP

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Figure S26. Public goods game - punishment decision screen with exemplary input (reset treatment).

investment overview

Group member 1 from group A invested 5 MU and kept 15 MU.

Group member 2 from group A (you) invested 0 MU and kept 20 MU.

Group member 1 from group B invested 10 MU and kept 10 MU.

Group member 2 from group B invested 15 MU and kept 5 MU.

You can now assign **Deduction Points (DP)** to other group members.  
Remember, for each **DP** you assign, the payoff of this group member is **reduced by 3 MU**.  
For each **DP** you assign to another group member, you have to pay **1 MU**.  
You can assign up to **6 DP** to each other group member.

Assign Deduction Points for group member 1 from group A:  DP

Assign Deduction Points for group member 1 from group B:  DP

Assign Deduction Points for group member 2 from group B:  DP

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Figure S27. Public goods game - punishment decision screen with exemplary input (shadow treatment).

deduction overview

You spent 20 MU on assigning deduction points.

**Group member 1** received 0 DP from other group members.

- 0 DP from group member 2
- 0 DP from group member 3
- 0 DP from group member 4

**Group member 2** received 0 DP from other group members.

- 0 DP from group member 1
- undefined DP from group member 3
- undefined DP from group member 4

**Group member 3 (you)** received 0 DP from other group members.

- undefined DP from group member 1
- undefined DP from group member 2
- undefined DP from group member 4

**Group member 4** received 0 DP from other group members.

- undefined DP from group member 1
- undefined DP from group member 2
- undefined DP from group member 3

round earnings

In this round ....

**Group member 1** earned:

$$0 \text{ MU (kept)} + 14 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 14 - 20 \text{ DP spend} = \textbf{-6 MU}$$

**Group member 2** earned:

$$10 \text{ MU (kept)} + 14 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 24 - 20 \text{ DP spend} = \textbf{4 MU}$$

**Group member 3 (you)** earned:

$$15 \text{ MU (kept)} + 14 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 29 - 20 \text{ DP spend} = \textbf{9 MU}$$

**Group member 4** earned:

$$20 \text{ MU (kept)} + 14 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 34 - 20 \text{ DP spend} = \textbf{14 MU}$$

proceed to next round

Contact Experimenter

Figure S28. Public goods game - exemplary punishment feedback screen (reset treatment).



**deduction overview**

You spent 0 MU on assigning deduction points.

**Group member 1 from group A** received 1 DP from other group members.

- 0 DP from group member 2 (group A)
- 1 DP from group member 1 (group B)
- 0 DP from group member 2 (group B)

**Group member 2 from group A (you)** received 3 DP from other group members.

- 1 DP from group member 1 (group A)
- 1 DP from group member 1 (group B)
- 1 DP from group member 2 (group B)

**Group member 1 from group B** received 0 DP from other group members.

- 0 DP from group member 1 (group A)
- 0 DP from group member 2 (group A)
- 0 DP from group member 2 (group B)

**Group member 2 from group B** received 0 DP from other group members.

- 0 DP from group member 1 (group A)
- 0 DP from group member 2 (group A)
- 0 DP from group member 1 (group B)

**round earnings**

In this round ...

**Group member 1 from group A** earned:

$$15 \text{ MU (kept)} + 12 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 1 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 24 - 1 \text{ DP spend} = \underline{23 \text{ MU}}$$

**Group member 2 from group A (you)** earned:

$$20 \text{ MU (kept)} + 12 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 3 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 23 - 0 \text{ DP spend} = \underline{23 \text{ MU}}$$

**Group member 1 from group B** earned:

$$10 \text{ MU (kept)} + 12 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 22 - 2 \text{ DP spend} = \underline{20 \text{ MU}}$$

**Group member 2 from group B** earned:

$$5 \text{ MU (kept)} + 12 \text{ MU (investment return)} - 0 \text{ DP received} \times 3 = 17 - 1 \text{ DP spend} = \underline{16 \text{ MU}}$$

[proceed to next round](#)

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Figure S29. Public goods game - exemplary punishment feedback screen (shadow treatment).